Dictatorial domains
In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-m...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2003
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1883 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2883/viewcontent/DictatorialDomains_av.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three. |
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