Dictatorial domains

In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-m...

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Main Authors: ASWAL, Navin, CHATTERJI, Shurojit, SEN, Arunava
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語言:English
出版: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2003
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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2883/viewcontent/DictatorialDomains_av.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soe_research-28832024-10-11T02:02:07Z Dictatorial domains ASWAL, Navin CHATTERJI, Shurojit SEN, Arunava In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three. 2003-08-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1883 info:doi/10.1007/s00199-002-0285-8 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2883/viewcontent/DictatorialDomains_av.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University social choice functions strategyproof dictatorship Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem restricted domains Economic Theory
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic social choice functions
strategyproof
dictatorship
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
restricted domains
Economic Theory
spellingShingle social choice functions
strategyproof
dictatorship
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
restricted domains
Economic Theory
ASWAL, Navin
CHATTERJI, Shurojit
SEN, Arunava
Dictatorial domains
description In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three.
format text
author ASWAL, Navin
CHATTERJI, Shurojit
SEN, Arunava
author_facet ASWAL, Navin
CHATTERJI, Shurojit
SEN, Arunava
author_sort ASWAL, Navin
title Dictatorial domains
title_short Dictatorial domains
title_full Dictatorial domains
title_fullStr Dictatorial domains
title_full_unstemmed Dictatorial domains
title_sort dictatorial domains
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2003
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1883
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2883/viewcontent/DictatorialDomains_av.pdf
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