Local coordination and market equilibria
We reformulate the local stability analysis of market equilibria in a competitive market as a local coordination problem in a market game, where the map associating market prices to best-responses of all traders is common knowledge and well-defined both in and out of equilibrium. Initial expectation...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2004
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1889 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2889/viewcontent/9714154.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | We reformulate the local stability analysis of market equilibria in a competitive market as a local coordination problem in a market game, where the map associating market prices to best-responses of all traders is common knowledge and well-defined both in and out of equilibrium. Initial expectations over market variables differ from their equilibrium values and are not common knowledge. This results in a coordination problem as traders use the structure of the market game to converge back to equilibrium. We analyse a simultaneous move and a sequential move version of the market game and explore the link with local rationalizability. |
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