Local coordination and market equilibria
We reformulate the local stability analysis of market equilibria in a competitive market as a local coordination problem in a market game, where the map associating market prices to best-responses of all traders is common knowledge and well-defined both in and out of equilibrium. Initial expectation...
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Main Authors: | CHATTERJI, Shurojit, GHOSAL, Sayantan |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2004
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1889 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2889/viewcontent/9714154.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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