Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions
We consider a directed search model with risk-averse workers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs who can set up firms that post wage-vacancy contracts, i.e., contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant, and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on...
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Main Authors: | JACQUET, Nicolas L., TAN, Serene |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2012
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2003 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3002/viewcontent/Wage_vacancyContracts_2012_JET.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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