Strategic sequential bidding for government land auction sales – Evidence from Singapore

This paper studies the extent to which equilibrium auction prices are pushed up sequentially due to strategic bidding behaviors in government land auction sales. Using a unique dataset that covers the universe of tendering prices submitted by all developers for all residential land auction sales in...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: AGARWAL, Sumit, LI, Jing, TEO, Ernie, CHEONG, Alan
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2018
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2014
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3013/viewcontent/Strategic_sequential_bidding_for_government_land_auction_sales_pp.pdf
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Similar Items