Strategic sequential bidding for government land auction sales – Evidence from Singapore
This paper studies the extent to which equilibrium auction prices are pushed up sequentially due to strategic bidding behaviors in government land auction sales. Using a unique dataset that covers the universe of tendering prices submitted by all developers for all residential land auction sales in...
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Main Authors: | , , , |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2018
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2014 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3013/viewcontent/Strategic_sequential_bidding_for_government_land_auction_sales_pp.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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