Universalism and the Value of Political Power
While legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation, near-unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive. I develop a game-theoretic model where players strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations, with no...
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2018
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2035 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3034/viewcontent/universalism_aug2017.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | While legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation, near-unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive. I develop a game-theoretic model where players strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations, with non-cooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation. To quantify the effects of political power and actual needs on the agreed-upon allocation, I structurally estimate the model using the "Bridge Bill Capital Budget" in 1992. I find that 9.58% of the budget would be allocated differently if allocations were determined only based on actual needs. |
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