Endogenous quality choice, signaling, and welfare

We consider a model in which each worker endogenously selects his own type through aprivate investment decision and selects a public signal in the labor market. Signaling thencontributes to social welfare through its influence on the quality choice. We offer a rationalefor the argument that there ar...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: LEE, Gea M., YOO, Seung Han
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2083
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3083/viewcontent/Lee.Yoo.12.2016.pdf
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English