Endogenous quality choice, signaling, and welfare
We consider a model in which each worker endogenously selects his own type through aprivate investment decision and selects a public signal in the labor market. Signaling thencontributes to social welfare through its influence on the quality choice. We offer a rationalefor the argument that there ar...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2016
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2083 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3083/viewcontent/Lee.Yoo.12.2016.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | We consider a model in which each worker endogenously selects his own type through aprivate investment decision and selects a public signal in the labor market. Signaling thencontributes to social welfare through its influence on the quality choice. We offer a rationalefor the argument that there are too many high-type workers from a welfare perspective,identifying circumstances under which separating equilibrium generates too many high-typeworkers while having to use the incentive-compatible signal and treat high-type workersdifferently in the market. The inefficiency can then be reduced in pooling equilibrium. |
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