Robustly optimal reserve price
We study a robust version of the single-unit auction problem. The auctioneer has confidence in her estimate of the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation, but does not have reliable information about the joint distribution. In this setting, we analyze the performance of second-pr...
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Main Authors: | HE, Wei, LI, Jiangtao |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2019
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2277 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3275/viewcontent/RobustlyOptimalReserve.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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