Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms

Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms

We prove that the Maskin monotonicity condition (by Bergemann, Morris, and Tercieux (2011)) fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environ-ment with lotteries and transfers. Different from previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., in...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHEN, Yi-Chun, KUNIMOTO, Takashi, SUN, Yifei, XIONG, Siyang
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2020
Subjects:
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continuous implementation
implementation
infor-mation perturbations
Maskin monotonicity
rationalizability
social choice function
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2355
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3354&context=soe_research
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
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Summary:We prove that the Maskin monotonicity condition (by Bergemann, Morris, and Tercieux (2011)) fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environ-ment with lotteries and transfers. Different from previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., infinite mechanisms with no integer game or modulo game are used; no transfer is imposed on any rationalizable profile;the message space is small; the implementation is robust to information perturbationsand continuous in the sense of Oury and Tercieux (2012).

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