Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms

• Main Authors: CHEN, Yi-Chun, KUNIMOTO, Takashi, SUN, Yifei, XIONG, Siyang
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2020
• Subjects: Complete information; continuous implementation; implementation; infor-mation perturbations; Maskin monotonicity; rationalizability; social choice function; Economic Theory
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2355; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3354&context=soe_research
• Institution: Singapore Management University

We prove that the Maskin monotonicity condition (by Bergemann, Morris, and Tercieux (2011)) fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environ-ment with lotteries and transfers. Different from previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., infinite mechanisms with no integer game or modulo game are used; no transfer is imposed on any rationalizable profile;the message space is small; the implementation is robust to information perturbationsand continuous in the sense of Oury and Tercieux (2012).