On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods economy
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition "desirable", in that it is tops-...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2020
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2459 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3458/viewcontent/DP1112.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition "desirable", in that it is tops-only, continuous, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as smilattice single-peakedness). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns our that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with a public good. Finally we relate semilattice single-peaked domains to well-known restricted domains under which strategy-proof and desirable rules do exist. |
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