The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings in two-sided matching markets with one-sided preferences. Our main result connects the revealed preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure of the set of stable matchings, and tests the rationalizability of a data...
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Main Authors: | HU, Gaoji, LI, Jiangtao, TANG, Rui |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2020
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2472 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3471/viewcontent/revealed_matching_av.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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