Mechanism design by observant and informed planners

We study the mechanism design problem where the planner can observe ex-post the first-ranked alternatives or peaks of voter preferences. We contrast this with the design problem where the planner has ex-ante information regarding the peaks of voter preferences.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, SEN, Arunava
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2022
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2595
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3594/viewcontent/Chatterji_Sen2022_MechanismDesignByObservant_av.pdf
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
Description
Summary:We study the mechanism design problem where the planner can observe ex-post the first-ranked alternatives or peaks of voter preferences. We contrast this with the design problem where the planner has ex-ante information regarding the peaks of voter preferences.