Mechanism design by observant and informed planners
We study the mechanism design problem where the planner can observe ex-post the first-ranked alternatives or peaks of voter preferences. We contrast this with the design problem where the planner has ex-ante information regarding the peaks of voter preferences.
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2022
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2595 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3594/viewcontent/Chatterji_Sen2022_MechanismDesignByObservant_av.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |