Undominated mechanisms

We study the design of mechanisms when the designer faces multiple plausible scenarios and is uncertain about the true scenario. A mechanism is dominated by another if the latter performs at least as well in all plausible scenarios and strictly better in at least one. A mechanism is undominated if n...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: BORGERS, Tilman, LI, Jiangtao, WANG, Kexin
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2024
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2773
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3772/viewcontent/Undominated_Mechanisms___Edited_.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
Description
Summary:We study the design of mechanisms when the designer faces multiple plausible scenarios and is uncertain about the true scenario. A mechanism is dominated by another if the latter performs at least as well in all plausible scenarios and strictly better in at least one. A mechanism is undominated if no other feasible mechanism dominates it. We show how analyzing undominated mechanisms could be useful and illustrate the tractability of characterizing such mechanisms. This approach provides an alternative criterion for mechanism design under non-Bayesian uncertainty, complementing existing methods.