Undominated mechanisms
We study the design of mechanisms when the designer faces multiple plausible scenarios and is uncertain about the true scenario. A mechanism is dominated by another if the latter performs at least as well in all plausible scenarios and strictly better in at least one. A mechanism is undominated if n...
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Main Authors: | BORGERS, Tilman, LI, Jiangtao, WANG, Kexin |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2024
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2773 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3772/viewcontent/Undominated_Mechanisms___Edited_.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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