On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually...
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| المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | , , |
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| التنسيق: | text |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2025
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2784 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3783/viewcontent/Strategy_proofness_pvoa_cc_by.pdf |
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