Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms under one-sided asymmetric information

This paper considers a bilateral-trade model with one-sided asymmetric information in which one agent (seller) initially owns an indivisible object and is fully informed of its value, while the other agent (buyer) intends to obtain the object whose value is unknown to himself. As Jehiel and Pauzner...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: KUNIMOTO, Takashi, ZHANG, Cuiling
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_working_paper/8
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=soe_working_paper
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English