Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms under one-sided asymmetric information
This paper considers a bilateral-trade model with one-sided asymmetric information in which one agent (seller) initially owns an indivisible object and is fully informed of its value, while the other agent (buyer) intends to obtain the object whose value is unknown to himself. As Jehiel and Pauzner...
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| المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | , |
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| التنسيق: | text |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2021
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_working_paper/8 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=soe_working_paper |
| الوسوم: |
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