p, and I have Absolutely No Justification for Believing that p: The Incoherence of Bayesianism
Bayesianism tells a story about the epistemic trajectory of an ideally rational agent. The agent begins with a ‘prior’ probability function; thereafter, it conditionalizes on its evidence as it comes in. Consider, then, such an agent at the very beginning of its trajectory. It is ideally rational, b...
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| المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | , |
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| التنسيق: | text |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2005
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/71 |
| الوسوم: |
إضافة وسم
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| المؤسسة: | Singapore Management University |
| اللغة: | English |
| الملخص: | Bayesianism tells a story about the epistemic trajectory of an ideally rational agent. The agent begins with a ‘prior’ probability function; thereafter, it conditionalizes on its evidence as it comes in. Consider, then, such an agent at the very beginning of its trajectory. It is ideally rational, but completely ignorant of which world is actual. Let us call this agent ‘superbaby’.1 We show that superbaby is committed to sincerely asserting propositions of the form [p and I am not justified in believing that p]. |
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