p, and I have Absolutely No Justification for Believing that p: The Incoherence of Bayesianism
Bayesianism tells a story about the epistemic trajectory of an ideally rational agent. The agent begins with a ‘prior’ probability function; thereafter, it conditionalizes on its evidence as it comes in. Consider, then, such an agent at the very beginning of its trajectory. It is ideally rational, b...
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Main Authors: | WILLIAMS, John N., HAJEK, Alan |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2005
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/71 |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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