Propositional Knowledge and Know-How
This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411-444...
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2008
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/250 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/1249/viewcontent/PropositionalKnowledgeKnowHow_2008.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411-444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist in propositional knowledge. The second part defends an analysis of know-how inspired by Katherine Hawley' (2003). Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, pp. 19-31, insightful proposal that know-how requires counterfactual success. I conclude by showing how this analysis helps to explain why know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist of propositional knowledge. |
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