Propositional Knowledge and Know-How

• Main Author: WILLIAMS, John N.
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2008
• Subjects: Knowing how; Propositional knowledge; Counterfactual success; Ability; Reliable methods; Ryle; Hawley; Hetherington; Williamson; Stanley; Lewis; Philosophy
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/250; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/1249/viewcontent/PropositionalKnowledgeKnowHow_2008.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411-444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist in propositional knowledge. The second part defends an analysis of know-how inspired by Katherine Hawley' (2003). Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, pp. 19-31, insightful proposal that know-how requires counterfactual success. I conclude by showing how this analysis helps to explain why know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist of propositional knowledge.