Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test

• المؤلف الرئيسي: WILLIAMS, John N.
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2012
• الموضوعات: Ramsey; Ramsey test; Moore; Chalmers; Hájek; Conditionals; Paradox; Belief; Conscious belief; Infallibility; Omniscience; Irrationality; Philosophy
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/966
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

Chalmers and Hájek (2007) argue that on an epistemic reading—one that seems reasonable—of Ramsey’s test for the acceptability of conditionals, the test is faulty. They argue for the claim that applying the test to each of certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or i...