Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test
Chalmers and Hájek (2007) argue that on an epistemic reading—one that seems reasonable—of Ramsey’s test for the acceptability of conditionals, the test is faulty. They argue for the claim that applying the test to each of certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or i...
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Main Author: | WILLIAMS, John N. |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2012
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/966 |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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