Still a New Problem for Defeasibility: A Rejoinder to Borges
I gave a new objection to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, namely that prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily replied to a version of my objection. He attempts to defend this re...
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2016
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1991 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/3248/viewcontent/1704023.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | I gave a new objection to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, namely that prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily replied to a version of my objection. He attempts to defend this reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which it is based is false. I show that my objection is not a version of the old one that Klein attempts (unsatisfactorily) to address, that Borges’s defence of Klein’s reply fails and that his argument against my new objection leaves it untouched. |
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