Still a New Problem for Defeasibility: A Rejoinder to Borges

• Main Author: WILLIAMS, John Nicholas
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
• Subjects: defeasibility; second-order knowledge; a posteriori knowledge; perceptual experience; Philosophy
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1991; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/3248/viewcontent/1704023.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

I gave a new objection to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, namely that prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily replied to a version of my objection. He attempts to defend this reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which it is based is false. I show that my objection is not a version of the old one that Klein attempts (unsatisfactorily) to address, that Borges’s defence of Klein’s reply fails and that his argument against my new objection leaves it untouched.