Agent-relative consequentialism and collective self-defeat
Andrew Forcehimes and Luke Semrau argue that agent-relative consequentialism is implausible because in some circumstances it classes an act as impermissible yet holds that the outcome of all agents performing that impermissible act is preferable. I argue that their problem is closely related to Dere...
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المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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التنسيق: | text |
اللغة: | English |
منشور في: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2020
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الموضوعات: | |
الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3200 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/4457/viewcontent/DCSD__Agent_Relative_Consequentialism.pdf |
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الملخص: | Andrew Forcehimes and Luke Semrau argue that agent-relative consequentialism is implausible because in some circumstances it classes an act as impermissible yet holds that the outcome of all agents performing that impermissible act is preferable. I argue that their problem is closely related to Derek Parfit's problem of ‘direct collective self-defeat’ and show how Parfit's plausible solution to his problem can be adapted to solve their problem. |
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