Are modal conditions necessary for knowledge?
Modal epistemic conditions have played an important role in post-Gettier theories of knowledge. These conditions purportedly eliminate the pernicious kind of luck present in all Gettier-type cases and offer a rather convincing way of refuting skepticism. This motivates the view that conditions of th...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | text |
| Published: |
Animo Repository
2019
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/3377 https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/context/faculty_research/article/4379/viewcontent/13.1.a5 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Institution: | De La Salle University |
| Summary: | Modal epistemic conditions have played an important role in post-Gettier theories of knowledge. These conditions purportedly eliminate the pernicious kind of luck present in all Gettier-type cases and offer a rather convincing way of refuting skepticism. This motivates the view that conditions of this sort are necessary for knowledge. I argue against this. I claim that modal conditions, particularly sensitivity and safety, are not necessary for knowledge. I do this by noting that the problem cases for both conditions point to a problem that cannot be fixed even by a revised similarity ranking or ordering of worlds. I offer as groundwork a set theoretical analysis of the profiles of the problem cases for safety and sensitivity. I then demonstrate that these conditions fail whenever necessary links constitutive of the epistemic situation actually obtain but are not modally preserved. © 2019 Mark Anthony L. Dacela. |
|---|