Are modal conditions necessary for knowledge?
Modal epistemic conditions have played an important role in post-Gettier theories of knowledge. These conditions purportedly eliminate the pernicious kind of luck present in all Gettier-type cases and offer a rather convincing way of refuting skepticism. This motivates the view that conditions of th...
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Main Author: | Dacela, Mark Anthony L. |
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Format: | text |
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Animo Repository
2019
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Online Access: | https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/3377 https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/context/faculty_research/article/4379/viewcontent/13.1.a5 |
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Institution: | De La Salle University |
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