Testing the theory of multitasking : evidence from a natural field experiment in Chinese factories
Using a natural field experiment with factory workers where we introduce a quantity-based performance-pay scheme in addition to their base salary, we quantify the impact of one-dimensional monetary incentives on both incentivized (quantity) and non-incentivized (quality) dimensions of output. While...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| 其他作者: | |
| 格式: | Article |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
2019
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/104907 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/47866 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12278 |
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| 機構: | Nanyang Technological University |
| 語言: | English |
| 總結: | Using a natural field experiment with factory workers where we introduce a quantity-based performance-pay scheme in addition to their base salary, we quantify the impact of one-dimensional
monetary incentives on both incentivized (quantity) and non-incentivized (quality) dimensions of output. While the management typically observes only quantity, we also observe quality by hiring quality-inspectors unbeknownst to the workers. While some workers receive a flat-rate base salary, others receive a piece-rate base salary. We find sharp evidence that workers under a flat-rate base salary trade off quality for quantity. Interestingly, this quantity-quality trade-off is statistically insignificant for workers under a piece-rate base salary. This variation in the treatment effect is consistent with a simple theoretical model that predicts that when agents are already incented at the margin, the quantity-quality trade-off resulting from additional incentives will be less prominent. |
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