A simulation framework for measuring robustness of incentive mechanisms and its implementation in reputation systems

In game theoretical analysis of incentive mechanisms, all players are assumed to be rational. Since it is likely that mechanism participants in the real world may not be fully rational, such mechanisms may not work as effectively as in the idealized settings for which they were designed. Therefore,...

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Main Authors: Liu, Yuan, Zhang, Jie, An, Bo, Sen, Sandip
Other Authors: School of Computer Engineering
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2015
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/107236
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/25569
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1072362020-05-28T07:19:06Z A simulation framework for measuring robustness of incentive mechanisms and its implementation in reputation systems Liu, Yuan Zhang, Jie An, Bo Sen, Sandip School of Computer Engineering DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering::Computer systems organization::Computer system implementation In game theoretical analysis of incentive mechanisms, all players are assumed to be rational. Since it is likely that mechanism participants in the real world may not be fully rational, such mechanisms may not work as effectively as in the idealized settings for which they were designed. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the robustness of incentive mechanisms against various types of agents with bounded rational behaviors. Such evaluations would provide us with the information needed to choose mechanisms with desired properties in real environments. In this article, we first propose a general robustness measure, inspired by research in evolutionary game theory, as the maximal percentage of invaders taking non-equilibrium strategies such that the agents sustain the desired equilibrium strategy. We then propose a simulation framework based on evolutionary dynamics to empirically evaluate the equilibrium robustness. The proposed simulation framework is validated by comparing the simulated results with the analytical predictions based on a modified simplex analysis approach. Finally, we implement the proposed simulation framework for evaluating the robustness of incentive mechanisms in reputation systems for electronic marketplaces. The results from the implementation show that the evaluated mechanisms have high robustness against a certain non-equilibrium strategy, but is vulnerable to another strategy, indicating the need for designing more robust incentive mechanisms for reputation management in e-marketplaces. 2015-05-18T03:18:39Z 2019-12-06T22:27:13Z 2015-05-18T03:18:39Z 2019-12-06T22:27:13Z 2015 2015 Journal Article Liu, Y., Zhang, J., An, B., & Sen, S. (2015). A simulation framework for measuring robustness of incentive mechanisms and its implementation in reputation systems. Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems, 30(4), 581-600. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/107236 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/25569 10.1007/s10458-015-9296-2 en Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems © 2015 The Author(s) (Published by Springer).
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
country Singapore
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering::Computer systems organization::Computer system implementation
spellingShingle DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering::Computer systems organization::Computer system implementation
Liu, Yuan
Zhang, Jie
An, Bo
Sen, Sandip
A simulation framework for measuring robustness of incentive mechanisms and its implementation in reputation systems
description In game theoretical analysis of incentive mechanisms, all players are assumed to be rational. Since it is likely that mechanism participants in the real world may not be fully rational, such mechanisms may not work as effectively as in the idealized settings for which they were designed. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the robustness of incentive mechanisms against various types of agents with bounded rational behaviors. Such evaluations would provide us with the information needed to choose mechanisms with desired properties in real environments. In this article, we first propose a general robustness measure, inspired by research in evolutionary game theory, as the maximal percentage of invaders taking non-equilibrium strategies such that the agents sustain the desired equilibrium strategy. We then propose a simulation framework based on evolutionary dynamics to empirically evaluate the equilibrium robustness. The proposed simulation framework is validated by comparing the simulated results with the analytical predictions based on a modified simplex analysis approach. Finally, we implement the proposed simulation framework for evaluating the robustness of incentive mechanisms in reputation systems for electronic marketplaces. The results from the implementation show that the evaluated mechanisms have high robustness against a certain non-equilibrium strategy, but is vulnerable to another strategy, indicating the need for designing more robust incentive mechanisms for reputation management in e-marketplaces.
author2 School of Computer Engineering
author_facet School of Computer Engineering
Liu, Yuan
Zhang, Jie
An, Bo
Sen, Sandip
format Article
author Liu, Yuan
Zhang, Jie
An, Bo
Sen, Sandip
author_sort Liu, Yuan
title A simulation framework for measuring robustness of incentive mechanisms and its implementation in reputation systems
title_short A simulation framework for measuring robustness of incentive mechanisms and its implementation in reputation systems
title_full A simulation framework for measuring robustness of incentive mechanisms and its implementation in reputation systems
title_fullStr A simulation framework for measuring robustness of incentive mechanisms and its implementation in reputation systems
title_full_unstemmed A simulation framework for measuring robustness of incentive mechanisms and its implementation in reputation systems
title_sort simulation framework for measuring robustness of incentive mechanisms and its implementation in reputation systems
publishDate 2015
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/107236
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/25569
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