A simulation framework for measuring robustness of incentive mechanisms and its implementation in reputation systems

In game theoretical analysis of incentive mechanisms, all players are assumed to be rational. Since it is likely that mechanism participants in the real world may not be fully rational, such mechanisms may not work as effectively as in the idealized settings for which they were designed. Therefore,...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Liu, Yuan, Zhang, Jie, An, Bo, Sen, Sandip
Other Authors: School of Computer Engineering
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/107236
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/25569
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English

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