On evidence and rational beliefs : a thesis in defence of intrapersonal uniqueness

There are three doxastic attitudes an agent can adopt in response to a given proposition: to believe, to not believe or to withhold judgement. What can we conclude about the individual rationality of the agents who, in response to the same set of evidence, come to adopt incompatible doxastic a...

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Main Author: Ng, Sarah Sin Ci
Other Authors: Teru Miyake
Format: Final Year Project
Language:English
Published: Nanyang Technological University 2021
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147343
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1473432023-03-11T20:11:54Z On evidence and rational beliefs : a thesis in defence of intrapersonal uniqueness Ng, Sarah Sin Ci Teru Miyake School of Humanities TMiyake@ntu.edu.sg Humanities::Philosophy There are three doxastic attitudes an agent can adopt in response to a given proposition: to believe, to not believe or to withhold judgement. What can we conclude about the individual rationality of the agents who, in response to the same set of evidence, come to adopt incompatible doxastic attitudes towards a target proposition? If there exists a uniquely rational doxastic attitude that should be adopted in response to a set of evidence, then we can grant that at most one agent is being rational in any belief-disagreement cases (viz., Uniqueness). Otherwise, we can grant that more than one agent is being rational in belief-disagreement cases (viz., Permissivism). This paper defends two claims: §1 defends a specific variation of Uniqueness that has no interpersonal import (viz., Intrapersonal Uniqueness). For a particular person, there is only one doxastic attitude she can rationally hold towards a proposition based on the evidence. §2 argues that Intrapersonal Uniqueness is reconcilable with the idea of intersubjective reasonable disagreements, a phenomenon that has interpersonal import. On this view, reasonable disagreements persist, not because the evidence is permissive in what it supports, but because total evidential sharing among agents is an impossibility. Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy 2021-03-31T05:43:15Z 2021-03-31T05:43:15Z 2021 Final Year Project (FYP) Ng, S. S. C. (2021). On evidence and rational beliefs : a thesis in defence of intrapersonal uniqueness. Final Year Project (FYP), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147343 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147343 en application/pdf Nanyang Technological University
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Humanities::Philosophy
spellingShingle Humanities::Philosophy
Ng, Sarah Sin Ci
On evidence and rational beliefs : a thesis in defence of intrapersonal uniqueness
description There are three doxastic attitudes an agent can adopt in response to a given proposition: to believe, to not believe or to withhold judgement. What can we conclude about the individual rationality of the agents who, in response to the same set of evidence, come to adopt incompatible doxastic attitudes towards a target proposition? If there exists a uniquely rational doxastic attitude that should be adopted in response to a set of evidence, then we can grant that at most one agent is being rational in any belief-disagreement cases (viz., Uniqueness). Otherwise, we can grant that more than one agent is being rational in belief-disagreement cases (viz., Permissivism). This paper defends two claims: §1 defends a specific variation of Uniqueness that has no interpersonal import (viz., Intrapersonal Uniqueness). For a particular person, there is only one doxastic attitude she can rationally hold towards a proposition based on the evidence. §2 argues that Intrapersonal Uniqueness is reconcilable with the idea of intersubjective reasonable disagreements, a phenomenon that has interpersonal import. On this view, reasonable disagreements persist, not because the evidence is permissive in what it supports, but because total evidential sharing among agents is an impossibility.
author2 Teru Miyake
author_facet Teru Miyake
Ng, Sarah Sin Ci
format Final Year Project
author Ng, Sarah Sin Ci
author_sort Ng, Sarah Sin Ci
title On evidence and rational beliefs : a thesis in defence of intrapersonal uniqueness
title_short On evidence and rational beliefs : a thesis in defence of intrapersonal uniqueness
title_full On evidence and rational beliefs : a thesis in defence of intrapersonal uniqueness
title_fullStr On evidence and rational beliefs : a thesis in defence of intrapersonal uniqueness
title_full_unstemmed On evidence and rational beliefs : a thesis in defence of intrapersonal uniqueness
title_sort on evidence and rational beliefs : a thesis in defence of intrapersonal uniqueness
publisher Nanyang Technological University
publishDate 2021
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147343
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