Peer disagreement, philosophical incommensurability and metaphilosophy
Peer disagreement is a paradoxical issue in philosophy. If philosophers cannot maintain the rationality of how thinkers can hold on to their beliefs, they would be forced to adopt a skeptical attitude towards philosophical beliefs. Analytic philosophers have dealt with this issue by advocating for e...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Final Year Project |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Nanyang Technological University
2021
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147422 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | Peer disagreement is a paradoxical issue in philosophy. If philosophers cannot maintain the rationality of how thinkers can hold on to their beliefs, they would be forced to adopt a skeptical attitude towards philosophical beliefs. Analytic philosophers have dealt with this issue by advocating for epistemological strategies that focus on maintaining rationality when thinkers are faced with peer disagreement. However, Richard Colledge suggests that Analytic philosophy needs to acknowledge the concept of philosophical incommensurability to properly respond to peer disagreement. In this thesis, I assess if Colledge’s suggestions are constructive. I provide a brief sketch of peer disagreement in Analytic philosophy, and I consider if the ideas of Heidegger and Gadamer from Continental philosophy are relevant for improving the peer disagreement debate in Analytic philosophy. |
|---|