A new PUF based lock and key solution for secure in-field testing of cryptographic chips

Scan-based side-channel attacks have become a new threat to cryptographic chips. Existing countermeasures require a secret test key to unlock the scan chain before in-field testing is allowed. However, test key disclosure poses tremendous risks to multiple crypto chips that share a common test key....

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Main Authors: Cui, Aijiao, Chang, Chip-Hong, Zhou, Wei, Zheng, Yue
Other Authors: School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2021
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/151585
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1515852021-06-22T03:48:13Z A new PUF based lock and key solution for secure in-field testing of cryptographic chips Cui, Aijiao Chang, Chip-Hong Zhou, Wei Zheng, Yue School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Centre for Integrated Circuits and Systems Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering Scan Chain Scan-based Side-channel Attack Lock and Key Golden Key Physical Unclonable Function Scan-based side-channel attacks have become a new threat to cryptographic chips. Existing countermeasures require a secret test key to unlock the scan chain before in-field testing is allowed. However, test key disclosure poses tremendous risks to multiple crypto chips that share a common test key. We address this open problem of in-field testing by leveraging physical unclonable function (PUF) to make the derived test key unique to each chip. The PUF’s response is invoked only once and hardened into a one-time programmable pad. The PUF response required by the designer to derive a test key of each crypto chip can only be recovered at the time of locking the scan chains without directly reading it out. The manufacturer can test the chip normally with no test time penalty before the passed chips are locked. The proposed solution is analyzed to be secure against all known scan-based side-channel attacks and the overhead incurred for the added security is negligibly small. Ministry of Education (MOE) Accepted version This research was supported in part by the National Natu- ral Science Foundation of China under Grant 61672182, the Guangdong Natural Science Foundation under Grant 2016A030313662 and the Shenzhen Overseas High-Level Talent Innovation Foundation under Grant KQJSCX20160226202510, and in part by the Singapore Ministry of Education Tier 1 Grant MOE2018-T1-001-131 (RG87/18). 2021-06-22T03:48:13Z 2021-06-22T03:48:13Z 2019 Journal Article Cui, A., Chang, C., Zhou, W. & Zheng, Y. (2019). A new PUF based lock and key solution for secure in-field testing of cryptographic chips. IEEE Transactions On Emerging Topics in Computing, 9(2), 1095-1105. https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TETC.2019.2903387 2168-6750 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/151585 10.1109/TETC.2019.2903387 2 9 1095 1105 en MOE2018-T1-001-131 (RG87/18) IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing © 2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1109/TETC.2019.2903387. application/pdf
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
Scan Chain
Scan-based Side-channel Attack
Lock and Key
Golden Key
Physical Unclonable Function
spellingShingle Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
Scan Chain
Scan-based Side-channel Attack
Lock and Key
Golden Key
Physical Unclonable Function
Cui, Aijiao
Chang, Chip-Hong
Zhou, Wei
Zheng, Yue
A new PUF based lock and key solution for secure in-field testing of cryptographic chips
description Scan-based side-channel attacks have become a new threat to cryptographic chips. Existing countermeasures require a secret test key to unlock the scan chain before in-field testing is allowed. However, test key disclosure poses tremendous risks to multiple crypto chips that share a common test key. We address this open problem of in-field testing by leveraging physical unclonable function (PUF) to make the derived test key unique to each chip. The PUF’s response is invoked only once and hardened into a one-time programmable pad. The PUF response required by the designer to derive a test key of each crypto chip can only be recovered at the time of locking the scan chains without directly reading it out. The manufacturer can test the chip normally with no test time penalty before the passed chips are locked. The proposed solution is analyzed to be secure against all known scan-based side-channel attacks and the overhead incurred for the added security is negligibly small.
author2 School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
author_facet School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Cui, Aijiao
Chang, Chip-Hong
Zhou, Wei
Zheng, Yue
format Article
author Cui, Aijiao
Chang, Chip-Hong
Zhou, Wei
Zheng, Yue
author_sort Cui, Aijiao
title A new PUF based lock and key solution for secure in-field testing of cryptographic chips
title_short A new PUF based lock and key solution for secure in-field testing of cryptographic chips
title_full A new PUF based lock and key solution for secure in-field testing of cryptographic chips
title_fullStr A new PUF based lock and key solution for secure in-field testing of cryptographic chips
title_full_unstemmed A new PUF based lock and key solution for secure in-field testing of cryptographic chips
title_sort new puf based lock and key solution for secure in-field testing of cryptographic chips
publishDate 2021
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/151585
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