Essays on the complexity of voting manipulation
In their groundbreaking paper, Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [6] argued that many well-known voting rules, such as Plurality, Borda, Copeland and Maximin are easy to manipulate. Following the direction proposed by this paper we examine the influence of features to which attention was not paid previousl...
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Main Author: | Obraztsova, Svetlana |
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Other Authors: | Edith Elkind |
Format: | Theses and Dissertations |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2012
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/50841 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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