A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks
Recently, several software encoding countermeasures were proposed, utilizing the side-channel hiding concept for software implementations. While these schemes aim to protect the underlying code against various leakage models, they can also be utilized against fault injection attacks to some extent....
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Main Authors: | Breier, Jakub, Jap, Dirmanto, Bhasin, Shivam |
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其他作者: | School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences |
格式: | Article |
語言: | English |
出版: |
2018
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在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88769 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44735 |
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