Combining trust modeling and mechanism design for promoting honesty In e-marketplaces

• Main Authors: Zhang, Jie, Cohen, Robin, Larson, Kate
• Other Authors: School of Computer Engineering
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: 2013
• Subjects: DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering
• Online Access: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/96783; http://hdl.handle.net/10220/13093
• Institution: Nanyang Technological University

In this paper, we propose a novel incentive mechanism for promoting honesty in electronic marketplaces that is based on trust modeling. In our mechanism, buyers model other buyers and select the most trustworthy ones as their neighbors to form a social network which can be used to ask advice about sellers. In addition, however, sellers model the reputation of buyers based on the social network. Reputable buyers provide truthful ratings for sellers, and are likely to be neighbors of many other buyers. Sellers will provide more attractive products to reputable buyer to build their own reputation. We theoretically prove that a marketplace operating with our mechanism leads to greater profit both for honest buyers and honest sellers. We emphasize the value of our approach through a series of illustrative examples and in direct contrast to other frameworks for addressing agent trustworthiness. In all, we offer an effective approach for the design of e-marketplaces that is attractive to users, through its promotion of honesty.