Design of an incentive mechanism to promote honesty in e-marketplaces with limited inventory

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Liu, Yuan, Zhang, Jie, Li, Qin
• مؤلفون آخرون: School of Computer Engineering
• التنسيق: Conference or Workshop Item
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: 2013
• الموضوعات: DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/97962; http://hdl.handle.net/10220/12264
• المؤسسة: Nanyang Technological University

In e-marketplaces with limited inventory where buyers' demand is larger than sellers' supply, promoting honesty raises new challenges: sellers may behave dishonestly because they can sell out all products without the necessity of gaining high reputation; buyers may provide untruthful ratin...