Design of an incentive mechanism to promote honesty in e-marketplaces with limited inventory
In e-marketplaces with limited inventory where buyers' demand is larger than sellers' supply, promoting honesty raises new challenges: sellers may behave dishonestly because they can sell out all products without the necessity of gaining high reputation; buyers may provide untruthful ratin...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | Liu, Yuan, Zhang, Jie, Li, Qin |
---|---|
Other Authors: | School of Computer Engineering |
Format: | Conference or Workshop Item |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2013
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/97962 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/12264 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
Similar Items
-
Combining trust modeling and mechanism design for promoting honesty In e-marketplaces
by: Zhang, Jie, et al.
Published: (2013) -
Feedback as "shadow of the present" : an alternative to reputation systems for e-marketplaces
by: Li, Qin, et al.
Published: (2013) -
Determining the optimal reporting strategy in competitive e-marketplaces
by: Noorian, Zeinab, et al.
Published: (2013) -
Inventory control in the presence of an electronic marketplace
by: Lee, L.H., et al.
Published: (2014) -
Inventory control in the presence of an electronic marketplace
by: Lee, L.H., et al.
Published: (2014)