The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law
10.1111/ablj.12155
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Main Authors: | Khoo, Kenneth, Soh, Jerold |
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Other Authors: | LAW |
Format: | Article |
Published: |
Wiley
2020
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Online Access: | https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/165806 |
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Institution: | National University of Singapore |
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