Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012
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Main Authors: | Bag, P.K., Sabourian, H., Winter, E. |
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Other Authors: | ECONOMICS |
Format: | Article |
Published: |
2011
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/19966 |
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Institution: | National University of Singapore |
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