A Sufficient Condition for the Tops-Only Property of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions in the Case of Two Voters

• Main Author: ZENG, Huaxia
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2011
• Subjects: social choice functions; tops-only property; voting; mathematical models; Economic Theory; Public Economics
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll/229; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1229&context=etd_coll
• Institution: Singapore Management University

In this thesis, we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and 2 voters, and address the following question: besides Domains D satisfying the Property T (Chatterji & Sen (2011) ), what are other characteristics of domains that induce every strategy-proof and unanimous social choice function f : Dn → A to satisfy the tops-only property? We impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a ∈ A, there exists a preference ordering where a is maximal. We identify a more general condition on domains that is sufficient for strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops-onlyness in the case of 2 voters. This condition is shown to apply to Linked Domains (Aswal, Chatterji & Sen (2003) ).