A Sufficient Condition for the Tops-Only Property of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions in the Case of Two Voters

In this thesis, we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and 2 voters, and address the following question: besides Domains D satisfying the Property T (Chatterji & Sen (2011) ), what are other characteristics of domains that induce every strategy-proof and unanim...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: ZENG, Huaxia
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2011
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll/229
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1229&context=etd_coll
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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