A state-stewardship view on executive compensation

A state-stewardship view on executive compensation

We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible ‘stewards’ rather than ‘agents’ of the state. We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerate...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Hao LIANG, RENNEBOOG, Luc, SUN, Sunny Li
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2015
Subjects:
State-stewardship view
agency theory
executive compensation
political connections
Asian Studies
Corporate Finance
Human Resources Management
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5006
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6005/viewcontent/A_state_stewardship_view_on_executive_compensation.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5006
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6005/viewcontent/A_state_stewardship_view_on_executive_compensation.pdf

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