A state-stewardship view on executive compensation
We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible ‘stewards’ rather than ‘agents’ of the state. We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerate...
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Main Authors: | Hao LIANG, RENNEBOOG, Luc, SUN, Sunny Li |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2015
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5006 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6005/viewcontent/A_state_stewardship_view_on_executive_compensation.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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